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Abstract 
Online dating scam has been rapidly increasing the internet’s rapid growth 
synchronically. However, there is no such tool that is available for the public to use it 
and prevent online dating scams. In this paper, techniques for scam detection in 
online dating websites profiles are described. A tool for automatically identifying fake 
profiles on dating websites such as e-Harmony, OkCupid, match.com is used in this 
paper. The web application generates a scam likelihood regarding the input profile’s 
description by using the scam action components. 
Regarding National Public Radio’s news recently, online dating scams had an impact 
of $143 million in the United States (“Americans Lost $143 Million In Online 
Relationship Scams Last Year,” 2019). This number indicates the link between the 
number of users that use online dating websites and the number of scams on these 
websites. The primary purpose of this paper is creating public awareness and alerting 
users for whom they might be contacting online dating websites. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
With today’s online world, social networking websites not only change how 
people look up for information, send or receive, but also the way people interact with 
each other has been shaped and rapidly evolving in the online world (Fire, Kagan, 
Elyashar, & Elovici, 2013). That is why many websites offer dating services to match 
with other users on their websites based on user profile description. People on these 
websites read biographies of other users and decide whether to interact or not. The 
existence of reciprocity in these dating websites creates a new challenge to the public 
as to whether the existing user profile is genuine or suspicious (Whitty & Buchanan, 
2016).  
An ever-increasing number of Americans are going to dating sites and portable 
applications in order to find love and fellowship. A Pew Research Center examination 
uncovered that about 60 percent of U.S. grown-ups consider internet dating a decent 
method to meet individuals, and Match.com, one of the most prevalent dating 
destinations, says individuals 50 and more established speak to its quickest developing 
portion of clients. Be that as it may, looking for sentimental delight online can have a 
noteworthy drawback: Cyberspace is brimming with scammers anxious to exploit 
desolate hearts. The con works something like this: You post a dating profile and up 
pops a promising match — attractive, savvy, smart, and amiable. This potential mate 
professes to live in another piece of the nation or to be abroad for business or military 
arrangements. Be that as it may, the person appears to be stricken and anxious to 
become more acquainted with you better and recommends you move your relationship 
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to a private channel like email or a talk application. Over weeks or months, you feel 
yourself developing nearer. You make arrangements to meet face to face; however, for 
your new love, something consistently comes up. At that point, you get a critical 
solicitation. There is a crisis (a restorative issue, maybe, or a business emergency), and 
your online friend needs you to wire cash rapidly. The person will guarantee to pay it 
back; however, that will never occur. Instead, the scammer will continue requesting 
more until you, at long last acknowledge you have been had. Fake suitors likewise 
search out focuses via web-based networking media, and they are progressively 
dynamic. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) got more than 21,300 reports of 
sentiment scams in 2018, up 250 percent from three years sooner. Announced 
misfortunes totaled $143 million, the most for a customer misrepresentation. The more 
seasoned the person in question, the more massive the budgetary toll, as per the FTC 
— the middle individual misfortune for individuals matured 70 and over was $10,000, 
contrasted with $2,600 for all exploited people. The warning signs can be summarized 
as it is shown below:  
 -Your new romantic friend sends you an image that looks progressively like a 
model from a style magazine than a customary depiction. 
 -The individual rapidly needs to leave the dating site and speak with you through 
email or texting. 
 -He or she lavishes you with attention. Swindlers often inundate prospective 
marks with texts, emails, and phone calls to draw them in. 
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 -The person in question more than once guarantees to meet you face to face yet 
consistently appears to think of a reason to drop. 
 Last month, for instance, in the United States a man who was the victim of this 
sort of trick – he related an assault procedure like that for a situation detailed in Chile in 
2018 – in the wake of having met the individual through an internet dating website and 
picked up his trust, the scammer mentioned the sending of cozy photographs. Soon 
after they were sent, the victim got a message from a man professing to be the dad of a 
minor and who took steps to document charges against him for sending a tyke an 
express picture, except if he sent him two paid ahead of time 'cash cards' with US$300 
each. The victim was educated that it was a trick after he had reached the police 
(“When love becomes a nightmare,” 2019). 
 Dating services aim to make their users meet in real life and fall in love. 
However, some websites cater to audiences with a specific ethnic group or cultural 
background (Huang, Stringhini, & Yong, 2015). Examples are christianmingle.com, 
lationoamericancupid.com, muslims4marriage.com. Some sites only focus on making 
people match based on profile descriptions. These services establish a connection 
between two users, and both scammers and the victim get notified. Once the 
connection established, the victim is ready to expose personal information (Elovici, Fire, 
& Gilad, 2015). Also, some dating services already expose user-profiles publicly, and 
this is another privacy concern. Accordingly, many users publish private information, 
and it gets exposed more than they thought (Elovici et al., 2015).  
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 A surprising component of online romance scams is that the culprits of this kind 
of crime depend on strategies intended to make victims act, of their own volition, in 
manners that conflict with their advantage. To put it another way, not at all like some 
other digital crimes, for example, fraud, an online romance scam is just fruitful to the 
degree that a scammer can influence a victim to complete solicitations. This may help 
clarify why numerous victims have announced they censure themselves for what 
happened, and that, instead of getting support, they have been met with displeasure 
from relatives and others (Whitty and Buchanan, 2012b). However, what might make an 
individual comply with the solicitations of a scammer who might be found hundreds, or 
even a great many miles away?  
Analyst Robert Cialdini has distinguished six mental standards regularly abused 
by those looking to pick up the compliance of others. Cialdini has talked about these 
standards finally in his milestone book Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, first 
distributed in 1984 and later reexamined in 2007. Throughout the years, this book has 
turned out to be required perusing in many showcasing courses and has additionally 
been retooled into a school reading material, presently in its fifth version. The 
compliance standards laid out by Cialdini might be a valuable system inside which to 
comprehend the extraordinary impact culprits of online romance scams have over their 
victims. 
 Intention to keep the family name alive continues from the first time of existence 
of humans until now. Even though dating scams existed in the past when there was no 
internet, it became so comfortable with today’s technology. When we consider why 
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scams exist in the online dating world, the financial number is the motivation behind 
these scams. In 2012, the online dating market value was 1.9 billion dollars (Kopp, 
Layton, Sillitoe, & Gondal, 2016). This market value attracts scammers for financial 
gain. The romance scam is being fed by vulnerable people who are desperately seeking 
for partners online. Also, some dating websites claim that they have over 15 million 
members registered, so this is a perfect amount of population for scammers (Huang et 
al., 2015). Even though simple scams such as 419 scams still exist on these websites, 
advance scammers find different methods to attract emotionally vulnerable people 
(Huang et al., 2015). 419 scam is in which scammers ask for money to build trust with 
their victims (Huang et al., 2015). 
  In the United States, regarding all single users who are looking for a partner, 
17.000 scams have been reported in 2017 (“Americans Lost $143 Million In Online 
Relationship Scams Last Year,” 2019). Since Facebook, LinkedIn, and other social 
networks offer a look-up option for existing users, dating websites only recommend 
profiles for users to read (Wani & Jabin, 2017). While online dating services focus on 
how to find a better way to match their users, they are not paying enough attention to 
protect their users. The scam gab is getting bigger and bigger while the online dating 
industry is also growing fast. Thus, improving user recommendations will potentially 
help to find an eventual partner to meet in real life.  
Problem Statement 
Since online dating websites are not capable of verifying every user profile for 
existence, a fake profile can be created easily for hostile intentions.  
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Nature and Significance of the Problem 
Online dating fraud is highly successful, which causes reasonable financial and 
mental damage to its victims (Whitty & Buchanan, 2016). In 2019 February NPR 
reported that people lost 143 million dollars because of online dating scams 
(“Americans Lost $143 Million In Online Relationship Scams Last Year,” 2019). This 
study will help to improve the understanding of online dating possible scam situations. 
Objective of the Study 
This study will help the public to identify fake profiles on dating websites. 
This study aims to create an environment where the users are more aware of possible 
scams.  
Study Questions/Hypotheses 
 Is there any software available for the public to identify the fake profiles on dating 
websites? 
 What are the potential benefits of using this software for the users?  
Hypotheses 1: There are no applications available to alert users for fake profiles on 
dating websites. 
Hypotheses 2: The software created by the researcher will aid the users to recognize if 
the user on the other side is a scam or not. 
Summary 
 In general, considering the previous researches, online dating security has not 
been deeply researched, and this has caused both financial and mental impacts on 
victims. Since the online world is expanding every other day, it brings more 
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challenges with itself. People not only look for the information they need but also look 
for partners that are single and looking for relationships. This intention opens a gate 
for scammers to exploit this new service as a financial gain. While the scammer uses 
this hole, scammers also leave prominent scars both financially and mentally on their 
target. This study focuses on how to improve the safety of online dating users against 
scammers on these websites. It also tries to answer if there is such a software that 
identifies fake profiles on dating websites. The hypotheses are shown below:  
Hypotheses 1: There are no applications available to alert users for fake profiles on 
dating websites. 
Hypotheses 2: The software created by the researcher will aid the users to recognize 
if the user on the other side is a scam or not. 
The next chapter will focus on the background of online dating scams and existing 
studies that are related to online dating services.  
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Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature 
Introduction  
 In this chapter, background related to dating scams and its impacts on users will 
be briefly explained. This brief explanation will include several reports and studies why 
online dating scam is such a huge problem. The next part of this chapter will include the 
studies that suggest a solution to online dating scams. Suggestions will have two 
sections. The first section will be a tool, and the second section will try to explain how 
this tool will be useful to prevent the online dating scam issue.  
 The last section in this chapter will compare the methodologies that were used 
before the solution of this study. It will briefly explain if the methodology that this study 
will offer was used in past studies. Then the previous methodologies will be analyzed 
why they are not useful anymore with current industrial scam techniques.  
Background Related to the Problem 
 Violations submitted utilizing PCs, and the Internet has turned out to be 
omnipresent in ongoing decades. From very complex system interruptions to the most 
low-tech digital stalking cases, the media is pervaded with tales about how the Internet 
is utilized by offenders to take cash and data, launder cash, and carry out different 
wrongdoings. A standout amongst the most worthwhile territories of cybercrime includes 
online tricks, as prove by the way that, in 2015 alone, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's (FBI) Internet Crime Complaint Center got protests totaling over $1 
billion. Tricks executed over the Internet can target associations or people and may take 
on a large assortment of structures. Nonetheless, of all cybercrimes answered to the 
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FBI in 2015, the second most elevated measure of misfortune was credited to a 
classification of extortion that solely targets people: "Certainty Fraud/Romance" (ICCC, 
2015, p. 16). Exasperatingly, proof proposes unfortunate casualties might particularly 
underreport this sort of misrepresentation, and that the genuine money related effect of 
this wrongdoing is far more prominent than what is shown by authority sources (Whitty 
and Buchanan, 2012a).  
 In any case, not at all like with numerous different scams, victims of online 
sentiment scams lose unmistakably more than cash. Victims of this kind of scam are 
mentally maltreated, frequently for quite a long time or even years. Victims have 
revealed encountering harm to connections and being left grief-stricken, humiliated, and 
profoundly embarrassed (Whitty and Buchanan, 2012b). During the ongoing preliminary 
of a sentiment scammer (who was eventually sentenced for duping victims of over $1.7 
million), victims affirmed they had petitioned for financial protection, lost occupations, 
homes, and had been exposed to extraordinary money related hardship. Past their 
monetary misfortune, victims affirmed they had fallen into discouragement and, now and 
again, had mulled over suicide. A few victims even affirmed that they were explicitly 
mishandled, and later extorted utilizing naked photos of themselves. The irritating 
subtleties of the case, which included several victims, incited the judge who directed the 
case to allude to the scam as "the most destroying crime one would ever envision 
without laying hands or even eyes on another individual" (DOJ, 2017, standard. 10). 
The number of online dating services is increasing rapidly, and the market is expanding 
more and more. However, the damage is spreading rapidly because of the lack of 
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security in the online dating world. It is creating irreparable both mental and financial 
damages on its victims. In 2011, the Melbourne Herald Sun newspaper reported that 
Australians lost $21 million to online dating scams (Kopp et al., 2016). In 2012, a study 
showed that 230,000 individuals had been scammed by online dating services in 
England (Whitty & Buchanan, 2016). This year in 2019, National Public Radio 
announced that Americans lost 143$ million because of online dating scams. The 
numbers indicate how a single service on the internet can have an enormous impact on 
users.  
 The increasing numbers of scams make users question their security on dating 
services. However, there has not been such a method found to solve this issue. The 
complexity of online dating services is evolving every other day; however, the security of 
these services is getting lower. Simple theory in cybersecurity says that complexity and 
security are inversely proportional. In another saying, while the complexity of application 
increases, the security of the application will go down. So, it is always important to find 
the balance and keep updating the application towards that balance. Considering the 
services that are available for online dating, the financial loss shows that the balance 
policy has not been being applied to their services. The gap is increasing with every 
other update, and unfortunately, most updates’ information shows that the application 
has almost none enhancements towards security.  
 The lack of security in online dating platforms not only harms financially, but it 
creates severe mental harms. All a sudden, being left alone by someone who declared 
love for you leaves deep cuts emotionally. Studies have shown that some victims 
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experienced dominant depressive thoughts, and some even experienced suicidal 
thoughts (Whitty & Buchanan, 2016). A report by the Office of Fair Trading in the United 
Kingdom has shown that the scam victims lose trust, confidence, and experience 
damaged self-esteem and a reduced sense of self-worth (Whitty & Buchanan, 2016).  
 Endeavors have been made to comprehend the advanced wonder of Internet-
based scams from various alternate points of view. One methodology has been to 
attempt to decide the commonness of the problem, by either attempting to learn the 
number of victims or the number of fraudulent sales. For example, a study directed by 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that 10.8 percent of U.S. grown-ups had 
been the victim of some fraud in 2011. In about 33% of these cases, the Internet was 
referred to as the methods by which the scam was at first advanced (Anderson, 2013). 
Another study, which required more than 2,300 subjects matured 40 and more 
established, found that 80% of respondents had been the objective of a fraudulent offer 
and that the Internet was the most significant single wellspring of these offers (Report 
On FINRA, 2018). 
 Concerning online romance scams explicitly, the FBI has announced that, in 
2015, its Internet Crimes Complaint Center got 12,509 objections identified with 
"Certainty Fraud/Romance" scams (ICCC, 2015). In any case, others have 
recommended information, for example, these, who are needy upon victims' self-
detailing, may significantly under mirror the true extent of the problem. For instance, a 
British study directed by Whitty and Buchanan (2012a) included asking subjects 
"whether they had lost cash or knew somebody by and by who had lost cash to an 
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online romance scammer" (p. 5). These discoveries, because of a delegate test of 
grown-ups in the United Kingdom, have driven Whitty and Buchanan (2012a) to gauge 
that more than 230,000 British natives may have been victims of online romance scams 
somewhere in the range of 2008 and 2011. This number is far higher than those self-
detailed by victims to purchaser insurance organizations in the U.K. during a similar 
period (Whitty and Buchanan, 2012a). 
 In the United States, there are various progressing endeavors to gather the 
information that incorporates data identified with the fiscal misfortune continued by 
victims of scams. For instance, since 1997, the FTC's Consumer Sentinel task has 
gathered buyer grievances of different sorts, including those identified with scams. 
Somewhere in the range of 2013 and 2015, more than four million of these grievances 
identified with fraud, with shoppers announcing over $4.1 billion in misfortune. Of fraud-
related grievances, 31% of victims showed that the Internet or email was the technique 
by which they were at first reached by fraudsters (Fletcher, 2019). The FBI additionally 
gathers data explicitly identified with Internet-based crimes through its Internet Crime 
Complaint Center. In 2015, the FBI announced that "Certainty Fraud/Romance" spoke 
to the second-biggest fraud type by victim misfortune, with victims answering to have 
lost over $203 million. By and large, victims of this sort of fraud announced lost $16,260 
(ICCC, 2015). 
 One more way to deal with the study of this point has been to investigate the 
conceivable hazard variables related to the victims of these sorts of scams, as well as to 
endeavor to all the more likely comprehend victim defenselessness to influence 
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systems utilized by fraudsters. For instance, a study led by the AARP recognized critical 
contrasts between the degrees of instruction and salary of victims of various kinds of 
scams. For instance, victims of venture scams were observed bound to be school 
instructed and to report a payment of $50,000 every year or more noteworthy. 
Alternately, victims of lottery scams were found to have no school training, and to report 
a salary of under $50,000 every year. The study additionally inspected respondents' 
helplessness too many advertising style questions and found those 50 years and more 
seasoned were "fundamentally progressively inspired by the influence articulations 
generally speaking" (Pak and Shadel, 2011, p. 38). Concerning online romance scams, 
a progression of studies led by Whitty and Buchanan (2012b) have recommended that 
men (regardless of whether hetero or gay) might be almost certain than ladies to move 
toward becoming victims when utilizing an internet dating webpage. Whitty and 
Buchanan (2012b) have likewise noticed that victims of online romance scams will, in 
general, report they became hopelessly enamored rapidly, in contradistinction to studies 
exhibiting most genuine sentimental connections develop all the more gradually. This 
has driven them to conjecture that numerous online romance scam victims are 
"profoundly energetic to begin to look all starry eyed at, possibly leaving them helpless 
against being scammed" (p. 11). 
 Another zone of the center has been to attempt to recognize the wellspring of 
Internet-based scams: who the culprits are, and where they are physically found. Longe 
and Osofisan (2011) have challenged the generally held conviction that most 
development charge scams begin from West Africa, given a study of IP locations related 
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to scam messages. The study, which consolidated a sizeable level of messages named 
"dating spam," found that countless scam messages started from spots outside West 
Africa, for example, Europe and North America. Nonetheless, Longe and Osofisan 
(2011) have recognized their study did not involve researching whether this example "is 
related to the number of volumes of Africans, Asians and other settlers' moving into the 
[sic] western countries" (p. 24). Others have reasoned that a superabundance of 
Internet-based scams executed outside West Africa is, all things considered, executed 
by West African-based scammers. For instance, Ultrascan (2014), a Dutch security firm 
that gathers and breaks down information identified with development expense scams, 
has noted West African culprits of development charge fraud (regularly alluded to as 
"419", in reference to an area of the Nigerian reformatory code) have relocated all 
through the world as of late: "There are 419 cells in about each nation on earth... 419er 
tasks are on the uptick in China (both territory China and Hong Kong), and in Malaysia. 
There are 419er cells in the USA, Canada, Mexico, Ghana, Brazil, Egypt, Russia, India, 
Pakistan, and the Czech Republic" (Ultrascan, 2014, p. 15). Online romance scams, 
which Ultrascan (2014) thinks about a variety of customary development charge fraud, 
are one of the scams routinely executed by West African scammers working throughout 
the world. 
 Due to the lack of security in online dating platforms, people have been suffering 
during their journey to find happiness. Past and recent researches prove the dating 
scam impact on its victims is such a big problem in the online world.    
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Literature Related to the Problem 
Fire claimed that Facebook is filled with tens of millions of fake user profiles 
(Fire et al., 2013). The reason behind this is that Facebook does not pay enough 
attention to its users’ privacy. The proposed solution was a tool to identify fake 
profiles. This tool is labeled as “Social Privacy Protector software for Facebook.” The 
software has three security layers to improve security. The first layer focuses on 
users’ friends' list and identifies who might pose a threat and restricts the personal 
information (Fire et al., 2013). The second layer focuses on basic privacy settings, 
such as what is available to the public (Fire et al., 2013). Third and the last year 
focuses on third-party applications that use personal data on Facebook (Fire et al., 
2013). More than 3.000 users downloaded the tool and restricted over nine thousand 
friends (Fire et al., 2013). It also removed 1,792 Facebook applications from their 
user profiles (Fire et al., 2013). 
The methods that were used by Fire are persuasive regarding 2013. Analyzing 
the personal data, analyzing Facebook’s privacy settings, and the Facebook 
applications that use personal data techniques are very accurate ways to detect fake 
profiles. However, Fire stated that their applications ran into too many false-positive 
flags. Private settings and the data set that was used for machine learning were not 
accurately set. Thus, the accuracy of this suggested tool was not very successful in 
detecting fake profiles on Facebook.  
In 2014, Radford questioned the service of E-Harmony. E-Harmony is another 
different type of dating service that uniquely claims itself in the industry. This service 
22 
 
 
 
states that they use science, and they have researches work for their services to make 
online dating easy and convenient (Radford, 2014). These scientific statement goes as 
“developed by a team of clinical experts …l is rooted in classical psychometric theory – 
which uses well-established standards to measure mental abilities and traits reliably.” 
(Radford, 2014). Radford thought that these services make direct and explicit claims 
about the scientific validity of its matching algorithm (Radford, 2014). It was so strange 
that e-Harmony did not have any reference regarding their scientific claims. Throughout 
his research, Radford demanded these studies from e-Harmony. Radford found that the 
website was not able to provide any research regarding their service. Later senior 
research scientist Gian Gonzaga from e-Harmony claimed that the methods that e-
Harmony uses are secret and cannot be published at Society for Personality and Social 
Psychology conference (Radford, 2014). He tried to offer evidence from non-peer-
reviewed studies.  
Regarding Radford’s results, e-Harmony is another marketing way to get people 
to register, and this is a scam. Radford calls this “Sweet Science of Scam,” and their 
methodologies cannot be trusted fully without clear evidence.  
Given that the casualties of online sentiment scams consent to collaborate with 
the solicitations of scammers, it might be anything but complicated to embrace an 
unfeeling mentality toward the individuals who have fallen prey to this sort of 
wrongdoing. In any case, the way that these scams are so pervasive thus fruitful 
proposes it is not right to property the activities of exploited people to ineptitude or 
guilelessness. Instead, an exertion ought to be made to comprehend why the strategies 
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utilized by online sentiment scammers can make exploited people act in such 
extraordinary ways. By lighting up how sentiment scammers endeavor known mental 
shortcomings, it might be conceivable not just to grow better methodologies toward 
alleviating this sort of wrongdoing yet likewise to advance more compassion toward 
exploited people.  
Cialdini has sketched out six mental rules that are frequently misused by 
individuals looking to pick up the consistency of others, regardless of whether for real or 
ill-conceived purposes:  
Reciprocation: Individuals are bound to agree to a solicitation when they feel a 
feeling of commitment or obligation toward the requestor. This feeling of commitment 
might be accomplished through giving little endowments or doing apparent favors for 
somebody yet may likewise be cultivated through mutual concessions: beginning with 
an enormous solicitation, at that point countering with a nearly littler solicitation when 
the first is rejected. This uses the inclination for individuals to feel a "commitment to 
make an admission to somebody who has made an admission to us" (Cialdini, 2007, p. 
37).  
Commitment and Consistency: In the wake of making an underlying 
responsibility, individuals regularly feel compelled to keep on acting as per that 
dedication, to "legitimize [their] prior choice" (Cialdini, 2007, p. 57). Individuals will, in 
general, adjust their mental self-view to responsibilities they accept they have made, 
mainly when those duties are recorded, recorded, or officially made. This inclination is 
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particularly robust when an individual accepts the person has made a responsibility 
"without solid outside weights" (Cialdini, 2007, p. 93).  
Social Proof: Individuals are bound to think about conduct as typical and to take 
part in that conduct if there is a recognition that others are doing likewise.  
Liking: Individuals are increasingly inclined to consent to the solicitations of 
somebody they like. Enjoying can be accomplished through any number of methods, yet 
frequently incorporates engaging a physical quality, developing a feeling of 
"equivalence" (individuals will in general like individuals they see as being like 
themselves), compliments, nature, and building up a feeling of universal participation 
toward a mutual objective.  
Authority: Consistency is simpler to get when it is seen that the requestor is in a 
place of power. This standard was maybe most broadly shown by Stanley Milgram's 
acquiescence tests. 
Scarcity: Individuals are regularly impacted to settle on choices dependent on the 
dread of losing an apparent chance. The view of shortage makes a feeling of direness, 
prompting blunders in judgment when individuals react by settling on choices rapidly. 
This rule owes a lot of its solidarity to an idea known as mental reactance: "...whenever 
a free decision is constrained or undermined, the need to hold our opportunities makes 
us want them... altogether more than already" (Cialdini, 2007, p. 245). 
Eloivici proposed a method for detecting spammers and fake profiles in social 
networks by using supervised learning. Supervised learning can be described as 
machine learning to simplify. Eloivici created different data sets regarding fake and legit 
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profiles. The invention did not target a specific social network platform. The illustrated 
profiles were tested on different platforms such as Google+ and MySpace (Elovici et al., 
2015).  
Eloivici set 4 different nodes to be extracted for each user. These nodes are: 
a) the number of friends of the user 
b) the number of communities the user is connected to 
c) the number of connections between the friends of the user; and  
d) the average number of friends inside each of the user’s connected 
communities (Elovici et al., 2015).  
Eloivici claimed that if the user has friends from different communities and the 
user’s friends list contains friends less than an average user has; these can be 
considered as red flags to identify the profile as fake. Later Eloivici simulation of these 
techniques in different platforms with different sizes of data sets indicated that the 
invention could identify fake profiles. However, Eloivici had only illustrations with limited 
data sets and specific steps to identify the spammers and fake profiles in social 
networks.  
Huang stated that with one in five relationships in the United States starting on 
one of these dating websites (Huang et al., 2015). In this manner, the attention on these 
websites increased by cybercriminals and scammers. Huang had different methods to 
identify scammers comparing to previous ones. First of all, Huang used large-scale data 
to study instead of using illustrations or small-scale data. The methodologies that were 
suggested by Huang can be categorized into four different sub-categories: 
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1) Behavioral-based Detection 
2) IP Address-based Detection 
3) Photograph-based Detection 
4) Text-based Detection (Huang et al., 2015). 
The other difference between Huang's study was the timeline. The study was 
performed for eleven months to aim for better accuracy.  
 Huang's first methodology was focused on behaviors from scammers. While the 
real people wanted to seek out for others and start a relationship, scammers had 
different behaviors. This methodology analyzes the time scammers take to respond or 
send the first messages, and also it analyzes the number of conversations that are held 
by scammers simultaneously (Huang et al., 2015). The behavioral system mechanism 
shows similarity to the anti-spam system that is proposed by the research community 
(Huang et al., 2015). 
 The second methodology that was proposed by Huang was an IP address-based 
detection system. If a scammer created different profiles by using the same network, 
this indicates serious attention as a red flag for the detection system (Huang et al., 
2015). 
 The third methodology is focused on the profile photos that are used by 
scammers. The studies show that scammers use the same photo over and over (Huang 
et al., 2015). These photos usually are an attractive young woman or a handsome 
middle-aged man (Huang et al., 2015). The detection system deploys a system that 
detects duplicated photos and flags those as malicious activity (Huang et al., 2015). 
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 The last method is called a text-based detection system. This system checks if 
the same message was sent to different users over and over. This is actually how spam 
detectors work, and Hu describes that scammers use the same method also in online 
dating websites.  
 Hu analyzed the application market for dating applications in China. Since the 
Google play store is not available in some parts of China, the different application 
markets were also included in the research. Over 2.5 million applications in the 
application market, 967 dating applications were found for dating purposes (Hu et al., 
2018). The analysis shows that significant numbers of people downloaded these 
applications. Later Hu dived into the applications they found and analyzed it. Hu 
presently endeavor to distinguish fake accounts from another perspective, i.e., the 
collaboration patterns. On the off chance that the accounts are genuine people, at that 
point, the messages ought to be significant to the subject of the discussion. In this 
manner, Hu play out a field concentrate on investigating the communication patterns of 
these fraudulent dating apps. For every family, Hu arbitrarily pick an application and 
introduce it on a genuine gadget. At that point, Hu register two accounts (1 male client 
and one female client) to sign in and begin a discussion. Moreover, we buy the premium 
administration for each application and analyze the outcomes when obtaining their 
administrations.  
Regarding China’s population, a total of 967 applications was downloaded over a 
billion times (Hu et al., 2018). Hu and his colleagues also analyzed the reviews on these 
applications for each different application market, and the results were also showing 
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that most of these applications that had over 100k reviews and most reviews were fake. 
Not only the reviews were fake, later Hu selected random applications among these 967 
dating applications. The signatures on these applications were mostly similar, and that 
showed that the same developer distributed these applications into different markets 
with different names and different company titles (Hu et al., 2018). Hu's researches also 
identified that the applications were mostly targeting fake young beautiful women 
profiles. The responses were not related to the topic and some applications on the 
market required to purchase VIP or premium membership to respond to the messages 
(Hu et al., 2018). Hu purchased the premium membership to take a further analysis 
step. The total cost of 22 memberships was 176 US dollars. The research identified that 
once the premium was purchased, the victim was able to respond; however, the bots 
stop responding. Therefore, the entire point on these applications was to convince 
victims to purchase. The accumulated revenue estimated for these applications that 
were conducted in research was around 200 million US Dollars to 2 billion US dollars.  
 Dating websites are closely related to fake profiles on social networks such as 
Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. So, Wani dives into different methods to identify fake 
profiles on social networks. Wani also compares the cloned profiles and fake profiles 
and their different intentions on scam levels. Wani gives a thorough characterization of 
various real and ghost profiles with an accentuation on informal online organizations. 
Compromised accounts are in reality official accounts; however, their proprietors do not 
have extensive oversight over these, and they have lost the control to a phisher or any 
malware specialist. As per an investigation, compromised accounts are the most 
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troublesome sort of accounts to be identified. Another ongoing examination says over 
97% of profiles are compromised instead of fake. The fake profiles are, for the most 
part, made to take the accreditations from genuine clients, and after that, fake profiles 
are deserted or deactivated.  
Compromised profiles have much worth since they have officially settled a 
dimension of trust inside their system and in this manner, cannot be adequately 
recognized and expelled by the specialist co-ops. Assailants, for the most part, use 
compromised profiles with critical consideration to use the dimension of trust. The 
writers have exhibited a way to deal with distinguishing compromised accounts from two 
mainstream online person to person communication destinations, Facebook and 
Twitter, by recognizing profiles that show unexpected changes in the conduct by 
utilizing measurable demonstrating and peculiarity recognition. Facebook has a 
framework to recuperate hacked accounts once announced. There is an alternative "my 
account was hacked" on the Facebook help page. One more examination uncovers that 
the compromised genuine profiles spread more noxious substances than different kinds 
of fake profiles (Wani & Jabin, 2017). Profile cloning is the burglary of personality from a 
current user's profile and to make another fake profile utilizing stolen accreditations 
(Wani & Jabin, 2017). We can say that profile cloning is the way toward taking the 
injured individual's private data to make one more profile that can secure the private 
data of unfortunate casualty's companions. These assaults are called Identity Clone 
Attacks (ICAs), which are of two sorts of profile cloning assaults to be specific single site 
and cross-site profile cloning. The scammers are generally very much financed, talented 
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people and have nearly everything accessible available to them and have authority over 
bargained and contaminated records (Wani & Jabin, 2017). 
Fake profiles are not quite the same as cloned ones from various perspectives. If 
there should be an occurrence of cloned profiles, an enemy makes one more profile of 
the effectively existing one, which is not the situation for fake profiles. Cloned profiles 
are, for the most part, made to extricate the data of an injured individual or his/her 
companions through the fake profiles are utilized for different purposes like spamming, 
promoting, and so forth. A few people make fake profiles to have one more account, 
while some make numerous accounts intentionally to go into individuals' sub-charts. 
There are two different ways to make fake profiles: one is made by composing content, 
and another is by physically making one more account. 
What is more, there are three fundamental purposes behind making fake profiles: 
First, Online Social Network specialist co-ops permit one account for every versatile 
association or per email-id, and to defeat this farthest point, individuals make one more 
account utilizing diverse email-ids or telephone numbers. The second is to improve the 
Figure 1: Intersite or Cross-Site Profile Cloning (Wani & Jabin, 2017) 
31 
 
 
 
ubiquity or the dimension of trust among the others. The third is to spread spam content 
among the genuine users. Fake elements exist wherever on the web like long range 
interpersonal communication websites, shopping sites, exchange sites and gatherings, 
web-based dating websites, banking frameworks, and so on. Furthermore, there is still a 
need to fortify safety efforts being utilized by online informal community sites to lessen 
editing fake profiles and to keep away from their dangers on interpersonal 
organizations. Fake profiles are destructive for OSNs and can be progressively 
hazardous in the future if not distinguished at the beginning period. 
 A bot is a computer program that delivers a few information to connect with 
people, particularly the people utilizing the web (netizens) to change their conduct. Bots 
produce over 60% of the complete web information. Online bots otherwise called web 
robots or basically, a bot is a computer program that performs different assignments 
rapidly and consequently, which were impractical for a human alone. Necessarily the 
bots were intended to help the people to accelerate their work and make it programmed. 
The first job of bots was to naturally total substance from different news sources, 
function as a programmed responder to customer inquiries, go about as a therapeutic 
master to determine wellbeing related issues, and programmed travel control. Be that 
as it may, these days, the bots are abused by the general population in different spaces. 
In informal organizations, bots are utilized to retweet a post without checking its source 
to make it viral. In online multiplayer diversions, bots are utilized to pick up the uncalled 
for the preferred position. Now and then, bots go about as computerized symbols to 
interface with people and make informal communities, which are much progressively 
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hard to distinguish. Bots can likewise be utilized to impact users, presenting messages, 
and on send companion demands in informal online organizations. 
Additionally, the gathering of individuals/association who are probably going to get 
influenced by the interruption of these personalities were likewise referenced in the 
table. From the practical perspective, bots are comparative as Sybil accounts, yet the 
principle contrast is that Sybil accounts are taken care of by users physically while bots 
are mechanized computer programs. The principle utilization of bots is web information 
slithering where a straightforward online computer program recognizes and separates 
the data from web servers at a lot higher speed, which was unrealistic by a human 
alone. Bots intended for malevolent exercises have turned into a genuine risk for the 
web. Different OSN specialist co-ops utilized a few different ways to battle the 
spambots. For instance, Twitter and Facebook have included an alternative "report as 
spam" to recognize a spam bot.  
Facebook additionally has its Facebook Immune System (FIS) to manage such 
issues. At the same time, the exploration in this area is in its beginning times. Users in 
different OSNs guarantee that the discovery systems are getting their official accounts. 
As per an examination, over 8% of bots exist in Twitter organize. The more significant 
part of them has been created for business purposes. Bots can be of two sorts 
generous and harmful. 
Police in the southern area of Guangdong, China have busted large rings of web-
based dating scammers who acted like appealing ladies to cheat men into purchasing 
expensive tea and different items, Guangzhou Daily reported (2018). Nearby police 
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reported at the preparation that they had broken 13 packs and caught 1,310 suspects  
(Sixth Tone, 2018). Each pack could approach up to 1,500 unfortunate casualties for 
every month, as their individuals would lure numerous men all the while. "These scam 
packs [succeed] because they catch the brain science of numerous men: When 
confronting lovely ladies, men lose their judgment, and feel too timid even to consider 
refusing," a Guangdong cop said at the preparation. As per the police, the possess 
utilized models' photos and the People Nearby capacity on WeChat, China's most 
common informing application, to bait unfortunate casualties into visiting. Following 
quite a while of structure up trust, they would cheat their "beaus" by utilizing anecdotal 
family disasters as stratagems to advance tea, wine, or interest in valuable metals 
through a stage constrained by the gathering. One long con included homegrown tea. 
Police clarified that the groups had built up a 60-day recipe for extortion: The scam 
specialists would go through 15 days calmly visiting, five days pushing the relationship 
into a sentiment, and 20 days demonstrating the beau that they had gone to deal with a 
weak granddad in the place where they grew up, where they were likewise figuring out 
how to deliver tea. The pack even enlisted models in hot jeans to posture for 
photographs and recordings in southeastern China's Yunnan region, one of the nation's 
outstanding tea-delivering areas. The scam would achieve its peak over the most recent 
20 days when the beau would be more than once influenced to purchase costly tea 
leaves. When the objective acknowledged he had been had, he would get blocked. As 
indicated by Guangzhou Daily, the vast majority of the scalawags were recent college 
grads, while others were "moderately aged uncles who got a kick out of the chance to 
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pick at their feet." Some systems sold tea, while others utilized tobacco, liquor, 
wellbeing items, or even oil depictions as their lure of decision. Many individuals have 
been captured for partaking in web-based dating scams in China. In 2017, police in 
eastern China's Zhejiang area busted a task that had utilized photographs of lovely 
ladies to draw exploited people into lotteries constrained by their ring. Another case in 
northeastern China's Liaoning region in 2016 saw 500 suspects captured. 
Here is a real online dating scam story based in Australia. (Commission, 2015) 
Georgina’s children signed her up to Facebook and gave her some basic lessons on 
how to use it. 
‘They told me everyone was using it and that it would help us keep in touch and 
see photos of my grandchildren.’ One day Georgina received a friend request from a 
serviceman on peacekeeping duties in Afghanistan. She decided to accept the request 
and allowed 'Jim' to be her Facebook friend. It did not start as a romance, but he said 
he was lonely and looking for friends to keep him company while he was stuck on duty 
in the middle of nowhere. Soon after befriending her, Jim told Georgina he had lost his 
wife to cancer, and his story of looking after her was similar to her own experience when 
her husband had died of cancer. ‘He then said he was being posted to Nigeria, but his 
time in the U.S military was nearly finished. He sent me pictures which I now know were 
stolen from someone on the internet. He kept saying he could not wait for us to be 
together. We became very close, and he emailed me every day, saying it was easier for 
him than using Facebook.’ Jim, who was a scammer, told Georgina he liked gemstones 
and wanted to set up a jewelry store when he retired. He said this was the best part of 
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being in Nigeria because it was close to where the precious stones were being mined, 
and he could buy them very cheaply. He told Georgina he was coming to see her but 
had some trouble with his bank card not working in Nigeria and could not get funds to 
pay for an export tax on his gemstones. Georgina transferred some money to him to 
cover the tax, which he explained was only two percent of the value of the gemstones 
but still amounted to $15 000. It was much money to send, but she figured he was a 
right and honest serviceman, and if things worked out, they would spend the rest of their 
lives together. ‘All was going well until his stopover in Malaysia. Customs officials seized 
the gemstones and demanded payment to have them released. This time they were 
asking $20 000. I told him it would take some time to get the money, and I had to 
borrow against the family home.’ Georgina sent the money to Malaysian officials but 
was told Jim was now in jail for smuggling and that she needed to contact his lawyer. 
‘The lawyer said he needed to get an Anti-terrorism and Money Laundering certificate, 
and this would be another $10 000. He said he also needed to pay for Jim’s court costs 
plus his fees, and this would be another $5000.’ Georgina sent the money, but then Jim 
said there was another government official demanding payment to extend his visa while 
he waited for the court to process all the documents. ‘Almost every day, I was contacted 
with a new demand for money. They sent me certificates signed by officials, forms to fill 
out, and bills for everything. If you wanted to get anything done quickly, you had to pay 
another fee. It seemed to me that the whole Malaysian government was corrupt. I do not 
know exactly how much money I sent, but it was well over $100 000. I did not care 
about money. I just wanted to help Jim, and I honestly thought he would pay me back.’ 
36 
 
 
 
Even when Georgina ran out of money, the demands didn’t stop. Unsure of what to do, 
Georgina finally talked to the police. They explained that her experience included the 
characteristic features of a dating and romance scam, and it would be implausible she 
would get her money back. She cannot help feeling in her heart that she let Jim down, 
but she knows that it was all a scam. 
Literature Related to the Methodology  
 Scam techniques on dating websites have been evolving while there is no such 
free tool that is available to prevent their impacts on society. The methodology that will 
offer the solution for this issue has two techniques to identify possible scam activity.  
 The first technique will focus on user profiles’ description and look for keywords 
that are previously identified based on past researches. This methodology will be called 
keyword matching. Whitty (2016) identified that if a user indicates that he is in the 
military or outside the country, that is a red flag for scam activity. Also, NPR indicates 
that if a user is acting like he or she is in love with the person they have not met in real 
life, it is a red flag. Not common grammar errors or errors in idioms will also indicate 
such a scam activity. The text-based methodology will focus on these matters and will 
add the total red flags in the scam likelihood.  
 The second methodology will scan for profile photos. If a photo that is used in the 
profile is public, this will indicate that the user profile is not real and designed for scam 
activities. The tool will compare the public database and the user profile and will 
generate a result. Scammers usually create a profile by using a handsome male or 
female public photo. The public profile that is identified on a profile will add another level 
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into scam likelihood. This method will use different approaches to achieve the goal. The 
first approach will be using Vision API. Then as a second approach, Vision API will be 
integrated with Cloud Auto ML Vision. As the third approach, Vision API, Cloud AutoML 
Vision will be integrated with Google Cloud Platform (GCP). Vision API is powered with 
Google’s deep learning models and provides: 
 -Face and landmark detection 
 -Explicit content detection 
 -Label detection 
 -Optical Character Recognition (OCR) 
AutoML gives the option to train the application for custom label detection using 
Google's Neural Architecture Search and state-of-the-art transfer learning. 
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Figure 2: Vision API (Google) 
Another image scanner API is called sightengine. This API was created with over 
40.000 references to detect images that are commonly used in romance scams. The 
scam discovery motor works by perceiving appearances of individuals known to be 
utilized in scammer profiles. So regardless of whether a given picture of such an 
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individual is new and obscure to our database, we will almost certainly hail it. The API 
was developed to detect nudity, celebrities, minors, image quality, artificial texts, 
weapons, alcohol, offensive & hate signs, face detection, scammers, and faces hidden 
with sunglasses. Here is an example of the use of sightengine API for detecting 
celebrities in profile photos.  
 
Figure 3: Sight Engine API (SightEngine.com) 
Code in plain text:  
// if you have not already, install the SDK with "npm install sight engine --save" 
var sightengine = require('sightengine')('{api_user}', '{api_secret}'); 
sightengine.check([‘{model}’]).set_url('https://sightengine.com/assets/img/examples/exa
mple7.jpg').then(function(result) { 
  // The API response (result) 
}).catch(function(err) { 
  // Handle error 
}); 
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Another example of the use of API for scammers:  
 
              Figure 4: Sight Engine API Sending Request (SightEngine.com) 
Code in plain text:  
// if you haven't already, install the SDK with "npm install sightengine --save" 
var sightengine = require('sightengine')('{api_user}', '{api_secret}'); 
sightengine.check(['scam']).set_url('https://sightengine.com/assets/img/examples/examp
le7.jpg').then(function(result) { 
  // The API response (result) 
}).catch(function(err) { 
  // Handle error 
}); 
SightEngine Scam API gives an option to send 2000 requests per month at no 
cost.  
 In conclusion, once user copies and the pastes the profile link in the dating 
website into the tool, the tool will generate a scam likelihood with a graph (Figure 5). 
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The tool will use the red flags that are generated by the key-word scam technique and 
public photo scanner technique.  
                               
Figure 5: Scam Likelihood Indicator  
Summary  
 This chapter covered two main topics. First, background work was covered. 
Background work included both psychological work and software work that has been 
done so far. Previous researches that tried to solve or analyze the scam on dating web 
services were also introduced. The background section was categorized based on the 
publish years by the researches. It was set as old to newer. The second section 
introduced the idea of the tool. Later sections discussed what could be used to make 
this tool alive. Two main APIs that were discussed how they would fit into this idea. The 
way of using their libraries was also introduced with a few simple lines of coding.  
 The next chapter will be more related to how the tool will be designed and used. 
The methodologies for the tool will be explained at a deeper level.  
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Chapter III: Methodology 
Introduction  
 This part will clarify what sort of study framework with the upsides and downsides 
to offering an answer for the online dating scam issue. It will profoundly clarify the AI 
calculation that is offered by Amazon to extract information from pictures in rekognition 
API. Likewise, the advantages and disadvantages of rekognition API will be clarified in 
detail. Later the exploration will incorporate outcome information to demonstrate how it 
very well may be utilized to take care of the issue. 
Design of the Study 
 With everything taken into account, both qualitative and quantitative research 
plans offer different understandings reliant on research focuses. This paper includes the 
obstructions and characteristics of both research plans. All through the past 
examinations exhibit that if there is a remarkable piece of total data that exists and 
consistent assurances supporting the data, inquiries about should move towards 
quantitative research plan. In any case, as to the examination point, there might be 
inadequate intelligent data or proof exhibited. Thus, the analyst will need to put a 
solitary effort to demonstrate what ought to be done to comprehend the issue. This sort 
of research subject will require a qualitative research plan. To plot, examine structures 
may fluctuate or can be united reliant on the exploration subject and past examinations. 
 Since the presence of past examinations are deficient in taking care of the issue, 
and the past investigations' information is not sufficient for the tackling issue, this 
investigation will utilize the mixed strategy to take care of the issue. 
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Data Collection 
 The techniques that were utilized by Fire are extremely persuading with respect 
to 2013. Investigating the individual information, breaking down Facebook's security 
settings, and the Facebook applications that utilization individual information systems 
are exact approaches to recognize the phony profiles. In any case, Fire expressed that 
their applications kept running into such a large number of false-positive banners. 
Interior settings and the informational collection that was utilized for AI were not 
precisely set. Along these lines, the exactness of this recommended device was not 
fruitful to distinguish the phony profiles on Facebook. 
Eloivici guaranteed that if the client has companions from various networks and 
the client's companion’s rundown contains companions, not exactly a regular client has; 
these can be considered as warnings to recognize the profile as phony. Later Eloivici's 
(2015) recreation of these strategies in various stages with various sizes of 
informational indexes demonstrated that the creation could distinguish phony profiles. In 
any case, Eloivici had just outlined with constrained informational collections and 
specific means to distinguish the spammers and phony profiles on interpersonal 
organizations. 
Past researches were showing information for various zones that are sub 
identified with online dating scam issues. Because of this reality, more research should 
have been finished. This examination will hold a light into this issue. 
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Tools and Techniques  
Amazon Rekognition makes it simple to add a picture and video examinations to 
your applications. You give a picture or video to the Amazon Rekognition API, and the 
administration can distinguish objects, individuals, content, scenes, and exercises. It 
can distinguish any improper substance too. Amazon Rekognition additionally gives 
profoundly precise facial examination and facial acknowledgment. You can distinguish, 
dissect, and analyze faces for a wide assortment of utilization cases, including client 
confirmation, classifying individuals checking, and open wellbeing.  
Amazon Rekognition depends on the equivalent demonstrated, exceptionally 
versatile, profound learning innovation created by Amazon's PC vision researchers to 
dissect billions of pictures and recordings day by day. It requires no AI skill to utilize. 
Amazon Rekognition incorporates a basic, simple to-utilize API that can rapidly break 
down any picture or video record that is put away in Amazon S3. Amazon Rekognition 
is consistently gaining from new information, and we continually include new names and 
facial acknowledgment highlights to the administration. Typical use cases for utilizing 
Amazon Rekognition incorporate the accompanying:  
• Searchable picture and video libraries – Amazon Rekognition make pictures 
and put away recordings accessible so you can find items and scenes that show up 
inside them.  
• Face-based client check – Amazon Rekognition empowers your applications to 
affirm client characters by contrasting their live picture and a reference picture.  
45 
 
 
 
• Sentiment and statistic investigation – Amazon Rekognition translate 
enthusiastic articulations, for example, glad, dismal, or shock, and statistic data, for 
example, sexual orientation from facial pictures. Amazon Rekognition can break down 
pictures, and send the feeling and statistic ascribes to Amazon Redshift for intermittent 
giving an account of patterns, for example, in-store areas and comparable situations. 
Note that a forecast of enthusiastic demeanor depends on the physical appearance of 
an individual's face as it were. It is not demonstrative of an individual's inner 
enthusiastic state, and Rekognition ought not to be utilized to make such an assurance.  
• Facial acknowledgment – With Amazon Rekognition, you can scan for pictures, 
put away recordings, and spilling recordings for appearances that match those put away 
in a holder known as a face accumulation. A face accumulation is a record of 
countenances that you claim and oversee. Recognizing individuals dependent on their 
appearances requires two remarkable strides in Amazon Rekognition:  
1. Record the countenances.  
2. Search the countenances.  
•Unsafe substance discovery – Amazon Rekognition can recognize grown-up 
and natural substances in pictures and put away recordings. Engineers can utilize the 
returned metadata to channel unseemly substance dependent on their business needs. 
The past is hailing a picture dependent on the nearness of dangerous substance, and 
the API additionally restores a various leveled rundown of marks with certainty scores. 
These names demonstrate explicit classes of a dangerous substance, which empowers 
granular sifting and the board of vast volumes of client created content (UGC). Models 
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incorporate social and dating locales, photograph sharing stages, websites and 
discussions, applications for kids, web-based business destinations, stimulation, and 
internet promoting administrations.  
• Celebrity acknowledgment – Amazon Rekognition can perceive VIPs inside 
provided pictures and in recordings. Amazon Rekognition can perceive a large number 
of big names over a few classifications, for example, governmental issues, sports, 
business, diversion, and media.  
• Text recognition – Amazon Rekognition Text in Image empowers you to 
perceive and separate literary substance from pictures. Content in Image bolsters most 
text styles, including exceptionally adapted ones. It distinguishes content and numbers 
in various directions, for example, those usually found in standards and publications. In 
picture sharing and internet-based life applications, you can utilize it to empower visual 
hunt dependent on a list of pictures that contain similar watchwords. In media and 
excitement applications, you can index recordings dependent on the meaningful content 
on the screen, for example, advertisements, news, sports scores, and subtitles. At last, 
in open wellbeing applications, you can recognize vehicles dependent on tag numbers 
from pictures taken by road cameras. 
Recognize celebrities. The celebrity API returns a variety of famous people 
perceived in the info picture. RecognizeCelebrities restores the 100 most prominent 
faces in the picture. It records perceived VIPs in the CelebrityFaces exhibit and 
unrecognized faces in the UnrecognizedFaces cluster. RecognizeCelebrities doesn't 
return big names whose appearances aren't among the most prominent 100 faces in the 
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picture. For every superstar perceived, RecognizeCelebrities restores a Celebrity 
object. The Celebrity item contains the VIP name, ID, URL connects to extra data, 
coordinate certainty, and a ComparedFace object that you can use to find the VIP's face 
on the picture. Amazon Rekognition doesn't hold data about which pictures a big name 
has been perceived in. Your application must store this data and utilize the Celebrity ID 
property as one of a kind identifier for the big name. In the event that you don't store the 
big name or new data URLs returned by RecognizeCelebrities, you will require the ID to 
distinguish the superstar in a call to the GetCelebrityInfo activity. You pass the info 
picture either as base64-encoded picture bytes or as a kind of perspective to a picture 
in an Amazon S3 can. On the off chance that you utilize the AWS CLI to call Amazon 
Rekognition tasks, passing picture bytes isn't upheld. The picture must be either a PNG 
or JPEG designed document.  
For instance, see Recognizing Celebrities in an Image: 
This activity expects authorization to play out the rekognition: 
RecognizeCelebrities activity.  
Solicitation Syntax  
{  
"Picture": {  
"Bytes": mass, "S3Object": {  
"Basin": "string", "Name": "string", "Rendition": "string"  
}  
}  
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Solicitation parameters. The solicitation acknowledges the accompanying 
information in JSON design.  
The information picture as base64-encoded bytes or an S3 object. In the event 
that you utilize the AWS CLI to call Amazon Rekognition activities, passing base64-
encoded picture bytes isn't bolstered.  
On the off chance that you are utilizing an AWS SDK to call Amazon 
Rekognition, you won't have to base64-encode picture bytes passed utilizing the Bytes 
field.  
Reaction Syntax  
{  
"CelebrityFaces": [  
{  
"Face": {  
"BoundingBox": { "Tallness": number, "Left": number, "Top": number, "Width": 
number  
},  
"Certainty": number, "Tourist spots": [  
{  
"Type": "string", "X": number, "Y": number  
} ],  
"Posture": {  
"Pitch": number, "Move": number, "Yaw": number  
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},  
"Quality": {  
"Splendor": number,  
"Sharpness": number }  
},  
"Id": "string", "MatchConfidence": number, "Name": "string",  
"Urls": [ "string" ]  
} ],  
"OrientationCorrection": "string", "UnrecognizedFaces": [  
{  
"BoundingBox": {  
"Stature": number, "Left": number, "Top": number, "Width": number  
},  
"Certainty": number, "Tourist spots": [  
{  
"Type": "string", "X": number, "Y": number  
} ],  
"Posture": {  
"Pitch": number, "Move": number, "Yaw": number  
},  
"Quality": {  
"Splendor": number,  
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"Sharpness": number }  
} ]  
356  
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}  
Reaction elements. On the off chance that the activity is productive, the 
administration sends back an HTTP 200 reaction. The accompanying information is 
returned in JSON design by the administration.  
Insights concerning every big-name found in the picture Amazon Rekognition can 
distinguish a limit of 15 big names in a picture.  
Type: Array of Celebrity objects OrientationCorrection  
The direction of the info picture (counterclockwise course). On the off chance that 
your application shows the picture, you can utilize this incentive to address the direction. 
The jumping box directions returned in CelebrityFaces, and UnrecognizedFaces speak 
to confront areas before the picture direction is remedied.  
On the off chance that the information picture is in .jpeg group, it may contain 
interchangeable picture (Exif) metadata that incorporates the picture's direction. 
Assuming this is the case, and the Exif metadata for the information picture populates 
the direction field, the estimation of OrientationCorrection is invalid. The CelebrityFaces 
and UnrecognizedFaces jumping box directions speak to confront areas after Exif 
metadata is utilized to address the picture direction. Pictures in .png configuration don't 
contain Exif metadata.  
51 
 
 
 
Type: String  
Legitimate Values: ROTATE_0 | ROTATE_90 | ROTATE_180 | ROTATE_270  
Unrecognized faces. Insights concerning each unrecognized face in the picture. 
Type: Array of ComparedFace objects 
Mistakes  
Access denied exception. You are not approved to play out the activity. HTTP 
Status Code: 400  
Image too large exception. The info picture size surpasses as far as possible. 
For more data, see Limits in Amazon Rekognition  
HTTP Status Code: 400  
Internal server error. Amazon Rekognition encountered an assistance issue. 
Attempt your call once more. HTTP Status Code: 500  
Amazon Rekognition Developer Guide RecognizeCelebrities  
Invalid image format exception. The gave picture organization isn't bolstered. 
HTTP Status Code: 400  
InvalidImage format exception. The gave picture organization isn't upheld. 
HTTP Status Code: 400  
Invalid parameter exception. The information parameter damaged a 
requirement. Approve your parameter before calling the API activity once more.  
HTTP Status Code: 400  
Invalid s3 object exception. Amazon Rekognition can't get to the S3 article 
determined in the solicitation. HTTP Status Code: 400  
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Provisioned throughput exceeded exception.The number of solicitations 
surpassed your throughput limit. In the event that you need to expand this point of 
confinement, contact Amazon Rekognition.  
HTTP Status Code: 400  
Throttling exception. Amazon Rekognition is briefly unfit to process the 
solicitation. Attempt your call once more. HTTP Status Code: 500 
Search faces. For a piece of the given information, face ID scans for 
coordinating countenances in the accumulation the face has a place with. You get a 
face ID when you add a face to the accumulation utilizing the IndexFaces activity. The 
activity thinks about the highlights of the information face with countenances in the 
predefined accumulation.  
We can likewise look through appearances without ordering faces by utilizing the 
SearchFacesByImage activity.  
The activity reaction restores a variety of countenances that match, requested by 
likeness score with the most noteworthy similitude first. All the more explicitly, it is a 
variety of metadata for each face coordinate that is found. Along with the metadata, the 
reaction additionally incorporates certainty esteem for each face coordinate, 
demonstrating the certainty that the particular face coordinates the information face.  
This activity expects authorization to play out the rekognition: SearchFaces 
activity.  
The solicitation acknowledges the accompanying information in the JSON group.  
The ID of the accumulation the face has a place with.  
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Type: String  
Length Constraints: Minimum length of 1. The most extreme length of 255.  
Example: [a-zA-Z0-9_.\-]+  
Required: Yes  
FaceId 
The ID of a face to discover matches for in the accumulation.  
Type: String  
Example: [0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}  
Required: Yes  
Face match threshold. Discretionary worth indicating the base trust in the face 
match to return. For instance, don't restore any matches where trust in matches is under 
70%. The default worth is 80%.  
Type: Float  
Substantial Range: Minimum estimation of 0. Most final estimation of 100.  
{  
"CollectionId": "string", "FaceId": "string", "FaceMatchThreshold": number, 
"MaxFaces": number  
}  
Required: No  
MaxFaces  
The most extreme number of appearances return the data. The activity restores 
the most extreme number of countenances with the most elevated trust in the match.  
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Type: Integer  
Substantial Range: Minimum estimation of 1. Greatest estimation of 4096. 
Required: No  
Reaction Syntax  
{  
"FaceMatches": [  
{  
"Face": {  
"BoundingBox": { "Stature": number, "Left": number, "Top": number, "Width": 
number  
},  
"Certainty": number, "ExternalImageId": "string", "FaceId": "string", "ImageId": 
"string"  
},  
"Closeness": number }  
],  
"FaceModelVersion": "string", "SearchedFaceId": "string"  
}  
Reaction Elements  
On the off chance that the activity is sufficient, the administration sends back an 
HTTP 200 reaction. The accompanying information is returned in the JSON position by 
the administration. FaceMatches   
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A variety of countenances that coordinated the info face, alongside the trust in 
the match. Type: Array of FaceMatch objects  
FaceModelVersion   
Adaptation number of the face location model related to the info gathering 
(CollectionId). Type: String  
SearchedFaceId 
The ID of the face that was looked for matches in a gathering.  
Type: String  
Example: [0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}  
Access denied exception. You are not approved to play out the activity. HTTP 
Status Code: 400  
inner server blunder  
Amazon Rekognition encountered an assistance issue. Attempt your call once 
more. HTTP Status Code: 500  
Invalid parameter exception. The information parameter disregarded a 
limitation. Approve your parameter before calling the API activity once more.  
HTTP Status Code: 400  
Provisioned throughput exceeded exception. The number of solicitations 
surpassed your throughput limit. On the off chance that you need to expand this cutoff, 
contact Amazon Rekognition.  
HTTP Status Code: 400  
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Resource not found exception. The accumulation indicated in the solicitation 
can't be found. HTTP Status Code: 400  
Throttling exception. Amazon Rekognition is incidentally incapable of 
processing the solicitation. Attempt your call once more. HTTP Status Code: 500 
The logic can be simplified, as shown below for the solution design.  
 
Figure 6: Implementation of Online Dating Scam Detector 
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Summary 
This chapter dived into the solution that was implemented by using Amazon 
Rekognition API and Selenium library in .NET. The details of what Amazon Rekognition 
API offers were explained in detail. After APIs capabilities were explained, the exception 
handling was also explained in detail by referring to the Amazon API documentation on 
Amazon.com. At the end of the chapter, the solution design diagram was introduced.  
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Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis 
Introduction 
The primary objective of Amazon Rekognition API distinguishes the celebrity face 
in the given picture. In this part, I will attempt a trial to see better how the API would 
create an outcome with a similar celebrity input yet in various circumstances. Every one 
of the information that was captured was available publicly. A significant piece of 
information was not exhibited since the objective was to make a place that may create 
issue results. Toward the finish of this trial, it will give how trustworthy the API that was 
utilized to illuminate the online dating scam issue.  
Data Presentation 
 This area will demonstrate example information to test Amazon Rekognition API. 
The primary segment will display the name of the individual's picture that was submitted 
into API, and the subsequent section will report the outcome that was created by 
artificial intelligence. All the photographs that were sustained into API were copied from 
google pictures. Some male celebrities' photos were acquainted with API with facial hair 
and no facial hair. Likewise, some female celebrities' photographs were submitted to 
API with short and long hair. A portion of the photos that are not celebrities were 
additionally nourished into API to perceive what results were produced. The explanation 
was an information test was made to see how exact outcomes were created by Amazon 
Rekognition artificial intelligence API. 
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Data Analysis  
Table 1 
Data Samples Input Output Comparison 
Input Image Rekognition API Result 
Jenna Fischer Jenna Fischer 
Angelina Jolie Angelina Jolie 
George Clooney (Short Facial Hair) George Clooney 
George Clooney (Long Facial Hair) No Celebrity Faces Recognized 
Abu Abdullah Hussein No Celebrity Faces Recognized 
Dennis Guster Enrique Krauze 
Mailewa Akalanka No Celebrity Faces Recognized 
Michelle Obama Michelle Obama 
Madonna  Madonna 
Madonna (Wearing an Eye Patch) Porcelain Black 
Lebron James (Facial Hair) Lebron James 
Adele  Adele 
Adele (Short Hair) Adele 
Rainn Wilson (No Facial Hair) Rainn Wilson 
Rainn Wilson (Facial Hair) No Celebrity Faces Recognized 
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Test results in details:  
- Amazon Rekognition API was fed with a picture in which Madonna was wearing an 
Eye Patch. The result was a celebrity; however, it was Porcelain Black. This was a 
false-positive result for Amazon Rekognition.  
- Amazon Rekognition API was fed with a picture in which Rainn Wilson had facial hair. 
API was not able to detect the celebrity. It was detected that if a celebrity had facial hair, 
API was not able to detect the celebrity. The result was indicated as ‘No celebrity was 
detected.’  
-Dennis Guster is a professor at St. Cloud State University in Information Assurance 
Department. His picture was downloaded from the department’s website and was used 
as an input for Amazon Rekognition API. The result was surprising, and it detected the 
professor’s picture as a celebrity. The indicated result was Enrique Krauze who is a 
Mexican historian. 
Summary 
 Information that was fed into Amazon Rekognition API shows that celebrities who 
are wearing some stuff that covers their appearances may bring about an inappropriate 
yield. In like manner, stars who are known without having facial hairs in motion pictures 
are likewise making some bogus yield results as the example information has 
demonstrated that a non-celebrity face can be perceived as a celebrity in certain 
circumstances, which is another off-base outcome. In any case, later, the information 
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that was encouraged into API with celebrities' photographs, which are appeared with a 
similar facial appearance in the movies they acted, was adequately perceived by 
Rekognition API. 
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Chapter V: Results, Conclusion, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 This section clarifies the aftereffects of the offered solution. The parts that the 
appropriate response was fruitful in actualizing and the result of what was accomplished 
was defined. The techniques and the libraries that were utilized during the execution 
were portrayed in detail. Later it plunges into future work, and the client situations 
should be possible. 
Results 
 The software that was implemented was able to detect the celebrity photos on 
dating websites. During the trial version, the software was set for the OkCupid dating 
website. By using the selenium front-end automation, the HTML tags in the OkCupid 
site was automated to find the user profile photos. The profile was set with a celebrity 
photo which was Steve Carell. Amazon Rekognition API was able to identify the 
celebrity and displayed a notification with the celebrity name. However, different 
celebrities from outside the US was put into the profile, Amazon Rekognition API had 
shown a different name for the celebrity, even though it was able to identify the photo as 
a celebrity.  
Conclusion 
 The examination showed that online profiles could be automated dependent on 
client contribution with Selenium. When the info is gotten, a picture can be filtered with 
Amazon Rekognition to comprehend whether the profile has a celebrity name 
photograph or not. 
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Future Work 
 Over time artificial intelligence will improve itself, and facial recognition will serve 
better results. For future work, researchers can focus on how to automate better on 
dating profiles yet not only the websites. This research was mainly focused on data 
scraping on websites and using artificial intelligence to detect faces. However, 
applications on phones have been trendy rather than websites. Today’s world people 
use their phones way often than computers for dating purposes. Hence, a future 
researcher should make an app both on android and apple markets. The same idea can 
be improved by using more scam flags to identify for better results. Also, this idea can 
be integrated with dating platforms such as Tinder’s or Match.com’s apps on the apps 
market and can be served to the public under Tinder Safe+ or Match+. 
In addition, instead of automating through the front-end, the same idea for the 
future can be automated through back end once dating services provide their public 
API. Data scraping through the back end will be way faster, and it will undoubtedly 
create fewer errors and better exception handling. This will also bring a better user 
experience.  
There were more indicators detected as scam flags through this research. 
However, all the indicators were not implemented in the application. For future 
researches, more scam indicators can be implemented to serve better to the public. For 
example, if the IP address of the profile can be detected, and it shows that the IP 
address is not from the U.S, this can be implemented. Furthermore, if the dating profile 
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had any text that was implying, he or she is outside the U.S, the profile intro can be 
scanned and added to the implementation. 
 As Facebook also came out with their dating environment, the expectation is it 
will become more popular, and since there is more research on scams on Facebook, 
there can be another application build specifically for Facebook for the future. Like the 
fact that Facebook has the top number of users compared to any other social network 
environment, the research will help millions out there by only explicitly focusing on 
Facebook. 
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Appendix A: Additional Information 
Here is the code for the Online Scam Detector Tool:  
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Web; 
using System.Web.UI; 
using System.Web.UI.WebControls; 
using OpenQA.Selenium; 
using OpenQA.Selenium.Chrome; 
namespace WebApplication1 
{ 
public partial class Main : Page 
{ 
public static ChromeOptions options = new ChromeOptions(); 
public static ChromeDriver driver = new ChromeDriver(options); 
protected void Page_Load(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
} 
protected void Unnamed1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
//Setting up chrome profile 
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options.AddArguments(@"user-data-dir=" + "C:\\Users\\ramiz\\OneDrive\\Desktop\\dist" 
+ "\\profile"); 
//Loading the Same Profile For Login Purposes 
options.AddArguments(@"user-date-dir" + 
"C:\\Users\\ramiz\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data"); 
options.AddArguments("--no-startup-window"); 
//Login 
driver.Navigate().GoToUrl("https://www.okcupid.com/login"); 
IWebElement email = driver.FindElement(By.CssSelector("#root > span > div > div > 
div.login2017-container > span > div > form > div.login2017-fields > div:nth-child(1) > 
span.oknf-typable-wrapper.oknf-typable-wrapper--text > input")); 
//Accessing email value from the html form and sending input 
email.SendKeys(Request.Form["email"]); 
//Send Password 
IWebElement password = driver.FindElement(By.CssSelector("#root > span > div > div 
> div.login2017-container > span > div > form > div.login2017-fields > div:nth-child(2) > 
span.oknf-typable-wrapper.oknf-typable-wrapper--password > input")); 
password.SendKeys(Request.Form["pass"]); 
System.Threading.Thread.Sleep(2500); 
//Click On Login 
IWebElement login = driver.FindElement(By.CssSelector("#root > span > div > div > 
div.login2017-container > span > div > form > div.login2017-actions > input")); 
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login.Click();  
//Wait for the automation process 
System.Threading.Thread.Sleep(2500); 
//Validate Login Session 
try 
{ 
IWebElement userExist = driver.FindElement(By.CssSelector("#navigation > div > 
span:nth-child(2) > div.profile-button-container > button > div > div > div")); 
Label1.Text = "Login Success!"; 
Response.Redirect("http://localhost:63581/Url"); 
} 
catch 
{ 
Label1.Text = "Login Failed!"; 
} 
} 
} 
} 
Url.aspx 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Linq; 
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using System.Web; 
using System.Web.UI; 
using System.Net; 
using System.Web.UI.WebControls; 
using OpenQA.Selenium; 
using OpenQA.Selenium.Chrome; 
using Amazon.Rekognition; 
using Amazon.Rekognition.Model; 
using System.Drawing; 
using System.IO; 
namespace WebApplication1 
{ 
public partial class Url : System.Web.UI.Page 
{ 
private string inputUrl; 
protected void Page_Load(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
if(Page.IsPostBack) 
{ 
inputUrl = TextBox1.Text; 
} 
} 
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public void Analyze_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
//Navigate to the input Profile to Analyze 
Main.driver.Navigate().GoToUrl(inputUrl); 
//Click on the profile thumbnail pic 
IWebElement profilepic = Main.driver.FindElement(By.ClassName("profile-thumb")); 
profilepic.Click(); 
//Download the profile Image 
ITakesScreenshot ssdriver = Main.driver as ITakesScreenshot; 
Screenshot screenshot = ssdriver.GetScreenshot(); 
Screenshot tempImage = screenshot; 
//Saving the image to analyze 
tempImage.SaveAsFile(@"C:\Users\ramiz\source\repos\WebApplication1\WebApplicati
on1\ProfilePics\image.png"); 
string photo = 
@"C:\Users\ramiz\source\repos\WebApplication1\WebApplication1\ProfilePics\image.pn
g"; 
//Rekognition API 
AmazonRekognitionClient rekognitionClient = new AmazonRekognitionClient(); 
RecognizeCelebritiesRequest recognizeCelebritiesRequest = new 
RecognizeCelebritiesRequest(); 
Amazon.Rekognition.Model.Image img = new Amazon.Rekognition.Model.Image(); 
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byte[] data = null; 
try 
{ 
using (FileStream fs = new FileStream(photo, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read)) 
{ 
data = new byte[fs.Length]; 
fs.Read(data, 0, (int)fs.Length); 
} 
} 
catch (Exception) 
{ 
WarningLabel.Text = ("Failed to load file " + photo); 
return; 
} 
img.Bytes = new MemoryStream(data); 
recognizeCelebritiesRequest.Image = img; 
WarningLabel.Text=("Looking for celebrities in image " + photo + "\n"); 
RecognizeCelebritiesResponse recognizeCelebritiesResponse = 
rekognitionClient.RecognizeCelebrities(recognizeCelebritiesRequest); 
WarningLabel.Text=(recognizeCelebritiesResponse.CelebrityFaces.Count + " 
celebrity(s) were recognized.\n"); 
foreach (Celebrity celebrity in recognizeCelebritiesResponse.CelebrityFaces) 
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{ 
WarningLabel.Text=("This profile is using a celebrity photo: " + celebrity.Name); 
} 
} 
protected void Cancel_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
//Cleanup the text box 
TextBox1.Text = ""; 
}     
} 
} 
Here is the front-end code:  
<%@ Page Title="Main" Language="C#" MasterPageFile="~/Site.Master" 
AutoEventWireup="true" CodeBehind="Main.aspx.cs" Inherits="WebApplication1.Main" 
%> 
<asp:Content ID="BodyContent" ContentPlaceHolderID="MainContent" runat="server"> 
<html lang="en"> 
<head> 
<meta charset="UTF-8"> 
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> 
<!--
==================================================================
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=============================--> 
<link rel="icon" type="image/png" href="Images/icons/favicon.ico"/> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="Vendor/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.min.css"> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="fonts/font-awesome-4.7.0/css/font-
awesome.min.css"> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="fonts/iconic/css/material-design-iconic-
font.min.css"> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="Vendor/animate/animate.css"> 
<!--
==================================================================
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=============================--> 
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="Vendor/css-
hamburgers/hamburgers.min.css"> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="Vendor/animsition/css/animsition.min.css"> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="Vendor/select2/select2.min.css"> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" 
href="Vendor/daterangepicker/daterangepicker.css"> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<link href="CSS/css/main.css" type="text/css" rel="stylesheet" /> 
<link href="CSS/css/util.css" type="text/css" rel="stylesheet" /> 
<!--
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==================================================================
=============================--> 
</head> 
<style> 
#services { 
width: 100%; 
border:0px; 
outline:0px; 
} 
</style> 
<body> 
<div class="limiter"> 
<div class="container-login100"> 
<div class="wrap-login100"> 
<form class="login100-form validate-form"> 
<span class="login100-form-title p-b-26"> 
Welcome To Safer Dating 
</span> 
<span class="login100-form-title p-b-48"> 
<i class="zmdi zmdi-font"></i>                 
<asp:Label ID="Label1" runat="server" Text=""></asp:Label> 
</span> 
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<div class="wrap-input100 validate-input"  data-validate = "Valid email is: a@b.c"> 
<input class="input100" type="text" name="email"> 
<span class="focus-input100" data-placeholder="Email"></span> 
</div> 
 <div class="wrap-input100 validate-input" data-validate = "Please select service"> 
<input class="input100" type="text" name="dating"> 
 <select name="services" id="services"> 
<option value="okcupid">OkCupid</option> 
<option value="match">Match.com</option> 
 <option value="eharmony">EHarmony</option> 
<option value="tinder">Tinder</option> 
</select> 
<span class="focus-input100" data-placeholder="Dating Service"></span> 
</div> 
<div class="wrap-input100 validate-input" data-validate="Enter password"> 
<span class="btn-show-pass"> 
<i class="zmdi zmdi-eye"></i> 
</span> 
<input class="input100" type="password" name="pass"> 
<span class="focus-input100" data-placeholder="Password"></span> 
</div>                    
<Asp:Button class="login100-form-btn" runat="server" Text="Login" 
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OnClick="Unnamed1_Click" Height="34px" Width="300px" /> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<script src="Vendor/jquery/jquery-3.2.1.min.js"></script> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<script src="Vendor/animsition/js/animsition.min.js"></script> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<script src="Vendor/bootstrap/js/popper.js"></script> 
<script src="Vendor/bootstrap/js/bootstrap.min.js"></script> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<script src="Vendor/select2/select2.min.js"></script> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<script src="Vendor/daterangepicker/moment.min.js"></script> 
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<script src="Vendor/daterangepicker/daterangepicker.js"></script> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<script src="Vendor/countdowntime/countdowntime.js"></script> 
<!--
==================================================================
=============================--> 
<script src="Scripts/main.js"></script> 
</body> 
</html> 
</div> 
</div> 
</div> 
</asp:Content> 
<!-- Url Aspx Page --> 
<%@ Page Language="C#" AutoEventWireup="true" CodeBehind="Url.aspx.cs" 
Inherits="WebApplication1.Url" %> 
<!DOCTYPE html> 
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<head runat="server"> 
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="CSS/cssButton/button.css"> 
82 
 
 
 
</head> 
<body> 
<form id="form1" runat="server"> 
<div> 
<p> Please enter the url of suspected profile.</p> 
<asp:TextBox ID="TextBox1" class="advancedSearchTextBox" 
runat="server"></asp:TextBox> 
 </div> 
<button style="--content: 'Analyze';" type="submit" name="btnAnalyze" id="btnAnalyze" 
runat="server" onserverclick="Analyze_Click"> 
<div class="left"></div> 
Analyze 
<div class="right"></div> 
</button> 
<button style="--content: 'Cancel';" type="button" name="btnCancel" id="btnCancel" 
runat="server" onserverclick="Cancel_Click"> 
<div class="left"> 
</div> 
Cancel 
<div class="right"></div> 
</button> 
</br> 
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</br> 
</br> 
<asp:Label ID="WarningLabel" runat="server" Text=""></asp:Label> 
</form> 
</body> 
</html> 
 
